Posts Tagged ‘subprime’

Anthony Downs On Financial Reform

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

Anthony Downs discusses the ins and outs of financial reform.  The nation’s financial system needs significantly more regulation than exists now.  The lack of tough regulatory powers strongly impacted the recent financial crash and the Great Recession that ensued.  The good news is that the Obama administration is moving firmly in this direction with financial reform legislation a critical item on its agenda.  This is the opinion of Anthony Downs,  a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution and former President of the Real Estate Research Corporation.  In a recent interview for the Alter NOW Podcasts, Downs said that between 1980 and 2007, the value of international capital markets – including bank deposits, assets, equities, public and private debt – quadrupled relative to the world’s GDP, lifting millions of people out of poverty.  Although unprecedented, this growth relied heavily on borrowed money to finance higher living standards and highly leveraged loans with limited reserves backing them.  In the end, the growth was unable to be sustained.

The financial reform legislation currently undergoing reconciliation by a Senate-House conference committee is not a reinstatement of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act – which separated investment and commercial banking — because banks will still be allowed to deal with securities.  Under the new law, banks will have to register derivatives with some type of formal exchange and maintain records on who is borrowing money and under what terms.  This marks a significant change from before the Great Recession, when derivatives were traded with virtually no oversight.

Downs believes that former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan contributed to the financial crisis in two ways.  In 2001, when Greenspan was informed that there was fraud in the subprime housing market and that he should do something about it, he refused to take action because he didn’t believe in regulation.  According to Downs, “that was a terrible mistake and meant that all the horrible loans made in the subprime market could continue unchecked.”  Greenspan’s second error was to maintain low interest rates for as long as he did at a time when an enormous amount of capital was coming into the United States economy from overseas.  Because investors were avoiding the stock market, they put their money into real estate.  That drove the price of properties sky high and destroyed the concept of intelligent underwriting and evaluating the risk before approving the loan.

 
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Don’t Want to Buy Distressed Assets? Then Try Insuring Them

Thursday, September 17th, 2009

Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has started selling insurance coverage on foreclosed homes occupied by distressed borrowers with the goal of making money from banks hurt by the mortgage market collapse.  These policies are riskier than usual home coverage because the properties may be neglected or vandalized.

“It’s part of the standard practice of Berkshire, which is to respond opportunistically,” said Tom Russo, a partner at Gardner Russo & Gardner, which owns shares in Berkshire.  “They have the capital to act and the credibility.”

mp_main_wide_warrenbuffett2Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway has $24.5 billion in cash, cut back on coverage of large commercial properties against catastrophes like hurricanes when the recession started and demand fell.  The home insurance venture positions Omaha-based Berkshire Hathaway to benefit from the supply of foreclosed properties that has grown fourfold in three years.  Because Buffett came through the subprime crisis in good shape, he has been able to increase his holdings in companies hurt by the recession in markets where demand is growing.

Berkshire Hathaway’s expansion in the area of foreclosed and distressed property insurance is noteworthy.  What’s key is that they have been able to come up with some level of asset valuation (i.e., home price or home replacement cost) in order to be comfortable pricing such insurance.  This is a good signal which would indicate that, at minimum, smart money is comfortable with home valuations at some level, and is willing to underwrite to those values.

S. Jafer Hasnain is a Managing Partner of Lifeline Assets, a Chicago-based real-estate private equity firm which he co-founded in 2008. Mr. Hasnain was previously a portfolio manager and analyst at AllianceBernstein for 14 years with stints at Merrill Lynch, Citibank and Goldman Sachs prior to that.

Some Alt-A Home Loans Go the Way of Subprime

Thursday, May 7th, 2009

It seems that we just can’t escape the bad financial news.  Now, mortgage loans made to supposedly better-off Americans are also heading south at an alarming rate.  This time around, the loans in question are Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgages,which are used by borrowers such as the self-employed who have reasonable credit standings but unpredictable incomes.image3272351g

Right now, the number of Alt-A loans with payments 60 days in arrears has quadrupled to 13 percent, compared with last year.  Because of the same slapdash underwriting standards that gave us the subprime mess, losses on Alt-A loans could eventually total $1 trillion.  According to the Bank for International Settlements, 40 percent of mortgages originated during the first quarter of 2007 were interest-only or negative-amortization Alt-A loans.

Some of these loans were granted, rather imprudently, based on minimal documentation of income and assets – sort of like the dreaded NINA loans. Alt-A borrowers pay higher interest rates than prime borrowers.  Many have option adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) where they can chose one of four types of payments to make each month.  The amount can range from the actual principal and interest due or it could be a minimum payment, often significantly less than the interest owed.  When the ARM resets the interest rate, an $800 per month payment could easily soar to $1,500.  And that’s the point at which the trouble typically begins.